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INTRODUCTION
Fit for work? Health, employability and challenges for the UK welfare
reform agenda
Introduction
This special issue grew from a shared concern about the need to strengthen and
expand the evidence base around the processes that have led to large numbers of
people claiming disability benefits in the United Kingdom (UK) and ‘what works’ in
helping people back towards employment. It brings together contributions from
some of the UK’s leading labour market and social policy researchers to provide
evidence and commentary on the recent and planned major reforms of ‘incapacity’
benefits in the UK. Some important findings are reported but authors identify
significant remaining gaps in knowledge.
The special issue addresses the following key questions, which require clear
answers if the UK government is to meet its target of a one million reduction in the
number claiming incapacity benefits (IBs) by 2016:
(1) What are the main causes of the long-term rise in the number of people
claiming IBs?
(2) What will reduce the number of claimants?
(3) What is likely to deliver policy effectively and efficiently?
Before exploring these questions in more depth, this introduction to the special issue
provides context to the welfare reform agenda, explains the UK system of IBs and its
recent reform, and identifies five assumptions behind the reforms.
Health, employability and challenges for welfare reform
‘Activation’ has emerged as one of the dominant areas of reform in European Union
(EU) welfare states (Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 2007). While the specific
priorities of activation have differed across countries (reflecting diverse welfare
regimes and traditions) there has been convergence around the idea that benefits and
services for people of working age need to be more focused on re-connecting
claimants with the labour market, through encouraging and compelling claimants to
be ‘active’ in seeking employment.
In the UK, as in some other welfare states, the focus of recent activation reforms
has switched from those claiming unemployment benefits (who, after a long series of
reforms, are now required to be actively seeking employment with increasing levels of
compulsion) towards those receiving disability benefits (‘incapacity’ benefits in UK
parlance). This reflects concerns that numbers claiming IBs have remained high in
the face of declining numbers on unemployment benefits over the last 15 years (at
least until the recession which started in 2008). In 2003, at the outset of an ongoing
programme of major welfare reforms in the UK, 7% of the working-age population
were receiving IBs, which provide support for people of working age who are unable
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to work because of sickness or disability. At the same time in the Netherlands just
under 10% of people of working age were claiming similar benefits  the highest rate
of IB claiming in the EU  followed by Sweden at 9% and Denmark at 7% (Kemp
2006). Such trends are of social and economic concern. Long-term benefit receipt,
poverty and ill health have consequences for individual wellbeing. Barriers to moving
back into work restrict labour supply, so that skills and experience become
unavailable to potential employers. And in the longer term, there are concerns
that an ageing population will place increasing pressure on welfare budgets (Loretto
et al. 2007), so that there is a need for more citizens to be economically active and
active for longer.
Large headline counts of people claiming IBs in the UK have also raised
suspicions that these benefits can be accessed too readily. These concerns reflect
wider political debates around whether citizens enjoy ‘rights’ without sufficient
‘responsibilities’. In the UK, policy-makers and the media often talk about a
‘dependency culture’, despite evidence that a substantial proportion of those
claiming IBs want to return to work given appropriate support (Beatty and
Fothergill 2005).
A number of welfare states have reformed disability benefits which variously aim
to reduce the number of new claimants or increase the flow of people moving off
such benefits. This is to be achieved in the UK by labour market activation
programmes and the gradual replacement of Incapacity Benefit  the main IB in the
UK  with the Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), which requires all but
the most severely sick or disabled new claimants to prepare for work, for example by
taking part in rehabilitation or retraining. Under current proposals, all existing IB
recipients will be re-evaluated under the ESA by 2013.
For the Labour government elected in 1997, the main explanations for the large
number of people claiming IBs lay in the manner in which these benefits were more
‘attractive’ to benefit claimants with ill-health seeking to avoid the greater
compulsion and conditionality associated with the UK’s main unemployment
benefit  currently Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). Consequently, from 2003 a range
of measures were introduced to activate claimants of IB, most importantly the
Pathways to Work scheme which introduced activation through compulsory Work-
focused Interviews (WFIs) and support measures which could be taken up by
claimants on a voluntary basis, culminating in the introduction of the ESA. With the
introduction of such activation measures, the Labour government to some extent
belatedly accepted the compelling evidence that high levels of incapacity claiming in
fact partly represented unemployment ‘hidden’ as sickness (see, for example, Beatty
et al. 2000). Similarly, by 2008 the Conservative Party in opposition had come to
acknowledge that attempts to ‘hide unemployment in the sickness register’ were
counter-productive.1 Accordingly, for the right-wing Centre for Social Justice (2009,
pp. 127128): ‘The evidence is that the large numbers on incapacity-related benefits
represent an employment problem and not one of overwhelming levels of
disability . . . taken together, the data suggests that the number of people receiving
IB is hiding the ‘‘real’’ level of unemployment in the UK’.
However, even if both main parties have come to acknowledge  at least implicitly 
that the incapacity problem is partly an employment problem, current policy has
arguably struggled to break free from the somewhat simplistic supply-side labour
market analysis that has defined the broader UK activation agenda. While there is a
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new consensus that high numbers on IBs mask hidden unemployment, the solution is
seen as involving increased compulsion upon claimants and conditionality in the
receipt of benefits. Indeed, the Labour government’s Green Paper No one written off:
reforming welfare to reward responsibility was significant in its unambiguous
argument for substantial increases in the compulsion faced by claimants of IBs,
arguing that ‘the individual’s right to support comes in exchange for taking clear
steps to improve their own circumstances’ (Department for Work and Pensions
[DWP] 2008, p. 26). The emphasis on ‘responsibility’ and increased compulsion
within the Green Paper was balanced by a commitment to provide a ‘universal offer
of personalised support’ (DWP 2008, p. 65), and such promises of individually
tailored services have more generally emerged as a key theme in activation policies
directed towards people claiming IBs (Stafford and Kellard 2007, Lindsay et al.
2008). Meanwhile, the Conservative Party has moved further towards supporting a
workfare model of activation, arguing for time-limited benefits and US-style ‘work-
for-dole’ programmes (Conservative Party 2008).
Previous research has convincingly demonstrated that demand-side economic
development strategies are required if the numbers claiming IBs in these areas are to
be substantially reduced (Beatty and Fothergill 2005). However, there remains
limited acceptance among policy-makers of the evidence that processes of job
destruction help to explain raised levels of incapacity numbers (except perhaps the
substantial concentrations of claimants in former industrial areas). Nor is there a full
acknowledgment that some claimants often face complex health and employability-
related barriers to work, which current and proposed supply-side policies are not
always able to adequately address (Lindsay et al. 2007, Kemp and Davidson 2009).
The reform of incapacity benefits (IBs) in the UK
The UK’s system of IBs was designed to provide income replacement for those of
working age unable to work due to sickness or disability. Employers are usually
required to pay Statutory Sick Pay for the first six months of incapacity for work,
after which an individual would become eligible for IB (or ESA from October 2008).
Those becoming incapacitated while not in employment are eligible for IB/ESA if
they have a recent record of employment. Some sick or disabled individuals without a
recent employment record are also eligible for IBs, in particular those with more
severe disabilities and lone parents. Incapacity for work was usually initially certified
by the family doctor or General Practitioner (GP). Once receiving benefit, claimants
were subject to a medical assessment conducted by a doctor working under contract
to the DWP. Apart from periodic medical assessments, there were no ongoing
obligations on most claimants.
There are three important features that distinguish the old system of IBs from
JSA, each of which is thought to have contributed to a diversion of claims from JSA
to IB over the last 2530 years or so. First, there was no mandatory activation
requirement on IB recipients. Second, IB was paid at a higher rate than JSA. Third,
the amount of JSA payable is means-tested against household income for the
majority of JSA claimants, whereas IB was not (although with some exceptions).
The introduction of the ESA in the UK has seen a significant change in how
individuals experience claiming. New claimants of ESA are allocated to one of two
groups: the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG) who are judged to be able to do
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some work now or in the future; or the Support Group (SG) who are judged to be
unlikely to ever be able to work on grounds of sickness or disability. In addition,
there are of course those who are deemed fit to work and are quickly moved off the
ESA altogether, usually onto JSA. In order to sort claimants into these groups, the
ESA regime has replaced the ‘Personal Capability Assessment’ (PCA) medical
examination with a more stringent Work Capability Assessment (WCA), which
effectively places the medical bar higher to qualify as incapacitated for work.
Claimants allocated to the WRAG are mandated to participate in a series of WFIs
after which a personalised programme of work-related activity such as training or
rehabilitation will be devised with a view to re-entering employment in the future.
Although this is not as stringent as the job search requirement under the JSA regime,
it does represent a form of increased activation and a presumption that individuals in
the WRAG will be on ESA only temporarily. Benefit levels for the first 13 weeks of a
claim and for those claimants refusing to take part in work-related activity are set
equal to JSA.
In terms of delivery, ESA will see an expansion in the contracting-out of
work-related activation to private and voluntary-sector service providers on a ‘pay-
by-results’ basis (i.e. the number of claimants moved into employment), following
recommendations in the Freud Report (Freud 2007). This mode of delivery is not
unique to the ESA but the numbers of claimants involved will mean contractors will
be delivering services to benefit claimants on an unprecedented scale.
The reform of IBs in the UK arguably reveals five key assumptions about the
causes of people claiming these benefits. First, there is some form of ‘dependency
culture’ in which people’s work ethic has declined and they therefore require
mandatory measures to reactivate their engagement with the labour market. Second,
many people currently on IBs should not really be there because they are not
‘sufficiently’ sick or disabled, hence the introduction of a tougher medical test. Third,
individual deficiencies are the cause of non-employment rather than labour market
structures and opportunities (or lack of), hence the need for work-related activity
including confidence-building, retraining and rehabilitation. Fourth, that employ-
ability declines with time spent on benefits, hence the need to move people quickly
off benefit before ‘dependency’ sets in. Finally, that private and voluntary-sector
contractors will be more effective at moving people from benefits into employment
than government Jobcentre Plus offices.
Challenges for the reform of incapacity benefits (IBs) in the UK
The three questions identified near the beginning of this introduction structured a
roundtable discussion held at a seminar in March 2009 at Edinburgh Napier
University attended by the contributors to this special issue. We synthesise here the
main points put across during that discussion, as well as providing pointers to some
of the findings and conclusions in the articles in the special issue.
What are the main causes of the long-term rise in the number of people claiming
incapacity benefits (IBs)?
The sharp decline in manual employment in the UK during the 1980s and early
1990s is closely linked to the rise in numbers claiming IBs. Not only did large-scale
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industrial job losses coincide with the timing of the sharpest rises in numbers
claiming these benefits, but the geography of IBs almost exactly matches the spatial
pattern of industrial decline (Beatty et al., this issue). Continued sluggish demand for
labour in these areas has kept numbers on IBs high, although in very recent years (at
least prior to the recession starting in 2008) numbers have come down but only after
unemployment rates have finally fallen to historically low levels (Webster et al., this
issue). These findings all lend support to the idea that a substantial proportion of the
increase in numbers claiming IBs was ‘hidden unemployment’ (Beatty and Fothergill
2005).
A second, related, factor thought to have contributed to the rise in numbers on
IBs is the marginalisation of certain groups in the post-industrial labour market.
Specifically, those with low skills and qualifications and those with experience in
manual occupations are at a greater disadvantage in today’s labour market than in
the former industrial jobs market. Similarly, poor health and disability make it
difficult for some individuals to secure jobs in an apparently more competitive
labour market with employers demanding more ‘flexibility’. Articles in this special
issue provide evidence of processes of marginalisation, for example in terms of the
low qualifications and substantial health barriers to employment among claimants
of IBs (Green and Shuttleworth, this issue) and the continuing rise in numbers of
‘National Insurance Credits Only’ incapacity claimants who are by definition people
without recent employment histories (Anyadike-Danes, this issue).
What will reduce the number of claimants?
Just as substantial employment decline in certain parts of the UK lay at the heart of
the rise in numbers claiming IBs, sustained employment growth in the same
geographic areas is required to move claimants back into employment  although
out-migration can also make some contribution to improving the balance of labour
supply and demand. Indeed, numbers claiming IBs started to come down towards
the end of the ‘long boom’ starting after the recession in the early 1990s but only  as
noted previously  once unemployment was at a historic low. After a generation or
more of economic stagnation, modest recovery finally came by the 2000s to some of
Britain’s former industrial areas, and it is in precisely these areas where the sharpest
declines in numbers claiming IBs have been recorded in recent years. Whereas in
economically buoyant areas the claim rates for IBs are low and difficult to reduce
further, in areas with high caseloads there are greater numbers of claimants with less
severe barriers to employment who are more able to move into employment when
jobs become available (Webster et al., this issue).
Notwithstanding the importance of the demand for labour, recent reductions in
numbers claiming IBs were accompanied by the piloting (mostly in parts of the
country with high claim rates) and subsequent national roll-out in April 2008 of the
Pathways to Work scheme aimed to help IB claimants back to work, which clearly
helped some individuals become ‘work-ready’ and take advantage of improved
economic conditions (Pathways to Work was similar to the activation measures in
the ESA but on a non-mandatory basis and without the more stringent medical test).
Despite some apparent successes of Pathways to Work (Bewley et al. 2007), there
were concerns expressed at the roundtable discussion that the accurate evaluation of
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national programmes is difficult because of the myriad of local initiatives running
alongside and spatial and temporal variation in labour market conditions.
Although sufficient demand for labour in the areas where claimants of IBs are
concentrated is an essential pre-condition to bring numbers down, it will not easily
do this on its own because of the considerable barriers to employment faced by many
claimants. For this reason, intensive and sustained activation and support measures
are required (Beatty et al., Green and Shuttleworth, Kemp and Davidson, Lindsay
and Dutton; all this issue).
Despite labour market processes being a key factor in the production of the large
number of people claiming IBs, a number of articles in this special issue point to
health as a major obstacle to the re-employment of claimants (Anyadike-Danes,
Beatty et al., Kemp and Davidson, Lindsay and Dutton; all this issue). For example,
Kemp and Davidson’s longitudinal study of new IB claimants shows an improvement
in health to be the single greatest predictor of a return to employment, while Beatty
et al. find health to be the dominant reason for job loss among claimants. It would
therefore be a mistake to implement the ESA as a straightforward labour market
activation regime  ESA claimants often face considerable health barriers to
employment which must be addressed if they are ever to return to sustainable
employment. As Lindsay and Dutton argue in their article, the complex health
problems faced by many IB/ESA claimants means that flexible health condition
management services are likely to be of increasing importance in helping people
towards work. For Lindsay and Dutton, the apparent increasing marginalisation of
condition management services  and especially those operated by NHS organisa-
tions/professionals  is a matter of concern.
In his article, Anyadike-Danes points to significant gaps in knowledge on why the
proportion of incapacity claimants with mental health problems has risen over time
and on what particular support needs such claimants have in returning to
employment. Furthermore, he cites important caveats in two key reports on the
links between health and employment used by the government to support its claim
that employment is good for health and the ‘work first’ philosophy for the sick and
disabled embedded in the ESA. The caveats are that low-status jobs can harm health
(Waddell and Burton 2006) and that the mental health of employed young people in
the UK is deteriorating (Bartley et al. 2005).
Two articles in this special issue specifically examine whether a ‘dependency
culture’ contributes to high numbers on IBs but neither finds evidence in support of
this. First, Kemp and Davidson find no difference in their ‘work commitment’
measure among claimants who returned to work compared with those who remained
on benefits. Second, in-depth interviews with claimants conducted by Beatty et al.
found little existing knowledge of the incapacity system prior to claiming, that
claimants were reticent to tell friends and neighbours they were ‘on the sick’ and
some felt ashamed or embarrassed about claiming. In contrast, however, Personal
Advisors working with claimants of IBs refer to a ‘benefits culture’ with the inter-
generational transmission of worklessness (Green and Shuttleworth).
Even if unable to detect a ‘dependency culture’ effect on employment outcomes,
Kemp and Davidson document three processes associated with duration on IB. First,
labour market engagement declines; second, stated barriers to employment increase;
and, third, the likelihood of moving off benefit reduces. Similarly, Beatty et al. find
that optimism about ever working again declines with duration on an IB. Taken
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together, these findings suggest a loss of confidence and motivation the longer
someone has claimed an IB. Therefore, there is merit in the ESA initially dealing only
with new claimants and trying to move some back into work quickly if their health
permits.
What is likely to deliver policy effectively and efficiently?
The appropriateness of the content and structure for current and planned services to
activate IB/ESA claimants is also a matter of considerable debate. People with health
problems who have been out of work for long periods are likely to face complex
barriers to progression, and there are concerns that programmes such as Pathways to
Work and the interventions under the ESA are too focused on achieving quick job
entries for the most able, and may not be able to deliver the range of support
required by those with more severe problems. It is also unclear as to what outcomes
will flow from continuing changes to the governance regime for the ESA, which has
replaced a public-sector partnership model established during the initial piloting of
welfare-to-work services for claimants with a system of contracting-out that
emphasises private-sector delivery.
The manner in which private and third-sector providers were invited to lead the
delivery of Pathways to Work in most of the UK suggests that the underlying
assumptions of the DWP-commissioned Freud Report (Freud 2007), which has
argued for an expansion of the contracting-out of activation services for people
requiring additional support, have been accepted by policy-makers. Indeed, even
‘pre-Freud’ the government had made clear that it expected that ‘future Pathways to
Work provision will be delivered primarily by the private and voluntary sector with
payment by results’ (DWP 2006, p. 6)  an approach designed to tap the expertise of
‘voluntary and private sector organisations, with their distinctive understanding of
the social and economic environment in a local area’ (DWP 2006, p. 18). The Freud
Report, largely welcomed by the DWP, retains the assumption that contracting-out
can deliver innovation and engage people who are beyond the reach of traditional
state-run welfare services. However, it is important that current governance systems 
whether based on contracting-out or more partnership-based approaches  are
assessed in terms of the benefits they deliver in relation to improved services and
outcomes for benefit claimants. Reservations about the evidence base for the benefits
of contracted-out delivery were expressed in the roundtable discussion and are again
highlighted in the article in this special issue by Lindsay and Dutton. Indeed, the
‘pay-by-results’ model of delivery has already run into financial difficulties because
providers are not achieving ‘results’ on the scale required to generate sufficient
payment to meet their costs.
In terms of the effectiveness of contracting-out to large-scale providers, Green
and Shuttleworth point to the loss of local knowledge accumulated among local
voluntary-sector organisations previously involved in service delivery. Even after
holding a contract for a period of time, many large providers find it difficult to build
up a detailed local knowledge because of high staff turnover. Such local knowledge
can be valuable in tailoring services and advice to individual customers, for example
working around local labour market conditions and perceptions and being able to
refer clients to other services available locally. Lindsay and Dutton find benefits in
Pathways to Work condition management services being managed and delivered by
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the NHS, with professional stakeholders interviewed pointing towards the manage-
ment expertise in the NHS in delivering a health-focused programme; and the high
level of trust in, and credibility of, the NHS in the eyes of claimants. Lindsay and
Dutton also conclude that the experience of Pathways to Work condition manage-
ment services suggests that large public-sector organisations can effectively deliver
services working in partnership with Jobcentre Plus, challenging the assumptions of
the UK government’s contracting-out agenda.
The new ESA regime is set to make extensive use of contracting-out delivery to
voluntary and private-sector providers. For UK policy-makers, such contracting-out
of support services is seen as vital to making individualised, personalised support
work  it is argued that the inclusion of such bodies in the delivery of activation
(combined with increasingly intensive personalised case management) has brought
greater choice into the system, with the Pathways to Work programme consistently
highlighted as an example of particularly good practice in this respect (DWP 2006).
However, there is evidence that promoting a genuine sense of choice among
participants in compulsory activation programmes can be difficult (Wright 2008).
Conclusion
The ‘answers’ to the three questions set out near the beginning of this introduction
appear to be  in brief  as follows. First, labour market restructuring and
marginalisation have driven the rise in numbers claiming IBs. Second, economic
regeneration in Britain’s less prosperous areas coupled with intensive and sustained
supply-side support measures (including activation) will  slowly  bring numbers
down. Third, delivery needs to be flexible and tailored to individual needs and needs
to be able to access local and expert knowledge in a range of organisations, including
Jobcentre Plus and the NHS as well as in the private and voluntary sectors.
Evidence presented in this special issue provides clear support for only one of the
five assumptions behind the ESA identified previously. Evidence of a ‘dependency
culture’ is difficult to find (assumption one). The cause of the rise in incapacity
caseload appears to be driven mainly by labour market restructuring rather than
individual deficiencies (assumption two). The predominance of health issues among
those on IBs challenges the claim that many claimants are not sufficiently sick or
disabled (assumption three). However, there does appear to be a loss of confidence
and motivation the longer an individual has been on an IB (assumption four).
Finally, in relation to assumption five, there are concerns over downsides of
‘contracting-out’  in particular more limited use of local and expert knowledge and
the under-utilisation of the NHS which generally brings trust and credibility.
Organisation of the special issue
We have sequenced the articles in this special issue so they move from the general
issues of the causes of the rise in numbers claiming IBs (Beatty et al., Webster et al.),
through questions of what might help reduce the number of claimants (Anyadike-
Danes, Kemp and Davidson) to issues of policy delivery (Green and Shuttleworth,
Lindsay and Dutton). The special issue is concluded with a radical critique of the
ESA reforms from a disability perspective (Grover and Piggott). Most articles,
however, address more than one of the three key questions articulated at the start of
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this introduction, so it has not been possible (or desirable) to neatly divide this
special issue into three parts.
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